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Singapore’s financial regulator wants banks to report their “cryptocurrencies”, but the instructions have nothing to do with disclosing holdings of bitcoin, ethereum or other digital assets.
TL;DR
- Banks must index their crypto assets.
- “Cryptocurrencies” does not mean cryptocurrencies.
- Interim requirements arrive later in 2026.
- Vulnerable systems will be migrated in order of priority.
- Crypto networks face similar security risks.
In this case, the term “cryptography” refers to crypto assets: encryption keys, digital certificates, signatures, and algorithms that protect customer information, payment instructions, and communication between financial institutions.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore will issue a formal supervisory outlook later in 2026, according to Reuters. Asia News Channel. Banks will receive staggered deadlines to define their cryptography, classify vulnerable systems and prepare alternatives that can withstand future quantum attacks.
What will banks need to report?
MAS does not require banks to publish their cryptocurrency wallets. It wants every organization to maintain an internal inventory of where encryption is being used across its operations.
This can include mobile banking systems, payment authorization, customer databases, internal communications, cloud platforms, and services provided by external technology companies.
Banks will also need to identify algorithm-based systems that powerful quantum computers might eventually be able to hack. The most sensitive infrastructure can then be moved to the front of the migration queue.
MAS first explained this approach in her book Consulting on quantum-related cybersecurity riskswhich encouraged financial institutions to map their crypto solutions, assess assets at risk and review their ability to adopt new security standards.
New supervisory expectations will transform this preparation into a more structured process with specific timelines.
The most vulnerable systems will move first
Not every system carries the same risks. Infrastructure used to allow payments or protect long-term customer records will require more urgent attention than information that quickly loses value.
Banks must also take into account encryption built into software, hardware, and services managed by third-party vendors. A financial institution may understand its own systems but still rely on a technology provider that cannot support newer algorithms.
MAS expects organizations to develop the expertise and governance necessary to manage those dependencies. This means assigning responsibility, coordinating with suppliers, and planning for legacy infrastructure that cannot be easily updated.
The regulator aims for Singapore’s financial institutions to become resilient before the end of the decade. Experts estimate that quantum computers capable of breaking existing encryption could emerge within five to 10 years, while secure migration could take years, said Chea Der Jeon, managing director of MAS.
Why do quantum computers threaten cryptography?
Modern banking security relies on mathematical problems that traditional computers cannot solve within a practical period of time. These accounts protect encryption keys and digital signatures from unauthorized access.
A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could handle some of these problems much more efficiently, weakening widely used forms of public-key cryptography. Financial transactions, confidential communications and stored customer data can then become exposed.
This capacity does not exist to the extent required today. The concern is that banks cannot wait until the threat becomes practical before finding and replacing the encryption spread across thousands of systems.
There is also the risk of attackers collecting encrypted information now and trying to unlock it years later. Therefore, data that must remain confidential for a long time may require early protection.
singapore Quantum Secure Migration Guide He describes the transition as a multi-year process that includes system discovery, risk assessment, testing and gradual deployment.
There will not be a single quantitative upgrade
Cryptography is integrated into almost every layer of banking infrastructure, so replacing it with one major update would create its own operational and security risks.
Instead, the transition will occur in phases. Banks should test how post-quantum algorithms impact processing speed, system compatibility and communications with other financial institutions before using them in live services.
They will also need cryptographic flexibility, that is, the ability to replace algorithms and keys without rebuilding the systems around them. Organizations with hardened or legacy infrastructure may need to update those systems before adding quantum-resistant protection.
the The first post-quantum standards finalized by NIST It provides algorithms for encryption and digital signatures, but their adoption across complex financial networks will take much longer than the publication of the standards themselves.
Why do crypto networks have the same problem?
MAS requirements apply to financial institutions, but the underlying threat also concerns cryptocurrency networks. Blockchains rely on cryptographic signatures to prove ownership, allow transactions, and prevent funds from being transferred without the correct private key.
Parts of the cryptocurrency sector are already exploring potential responses. Bitcoin developers discussed A multi-year migration away from weak quantum wallet signatures, while post-quantum testing of the BNB chain reduced cross-regional throughput by around 40%, showing that stronger security can lead to significant performance costs.
Thus, banks and blockchain systems face a similar trade-off. The new algorithm may provide stronger security, but it still has to process transactions efficiently and work with existing wallets, applications, and infrastructure.
Singapore has already tested this technology
Singapore’s preparations have gone beyond political guidance. Completed by MAS and Bank of France Experimenting with post-quantum cross-border cryptography Using quantum-resistant algorithms to sign and encrypt communications over traditional Internet infrastructure.
Testing showed that post-quantum protection can work across existing international communication channels. Wider rollout will still require banks to update certificates, key exchange systems, and shared technical standards with other institutions.
MAS is expected to publish its detailed supervisory outlook later in 2026. The forward timelines will cover crypto stocks, migration priorities, and governance needed to oversee the transition.
For crypto readers, the title may initially sound like Singapore is asking banks to disclose their holdings of digital assets. The real politics extend further: the regulator is preparing the security behind digital finance for a threat that could ultimately affect banks, payment networks and blockchains alike.
Quantum computers cannot break modern financial encryption on a large scale today. Singapore is acting now because replacing this security securely could take most of a decade.
